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Real Property
by Linda S. Finley*
I. INTRODUCTION

This Article looks at notable issues regarding Georgia real property
law during the survey period, including legislation enacted by the
Georgia General Assembly and case law decided in Georgia courts. The
Author is happy to report she no longer feels compelled to begin the
Survey by discussing the dire economic conditions of the state of Georgia
or, indeed, the United States as a whole. At the time of the writing of
this Survey, RealtyTrac, which reports national foreclosure statistics,
released its mid-year 2016 foreclosure report showing that foreclosure
activity affecting Georgia real property in the month of July 2016 was
15% lower than the previous month and 44% lower than the same period
the previous year. Disturbing, however, was the economic statistic
reporting that Georgia home sales for June 2016 were down 33% from
the previous month and 25% from the same period in 2015.1 Only time
will tell exactly what these contradictory trends indicate, but, in the
meantime, whether the economy is improving or declining, this Survey
attempts to provide the practitioner, student, or lay person with a brief
outline of what has occurred in this area of the law during the last twelve
months.

* Shareholder in the law firm of Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC,
Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer University (B.A., 1978); Mercer University, Walter F. George
School of Law (J.D., 1981); Member, State and Federal Bars of Georgia and Florida,
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and the United States Supreme Court.
The Author wishes to give special thanks to Kitty S. Davis and Teta Hakim for
handling the administrative tasks necessary to bring this Survey Article to print.
Additional thanks goes to Carol V. Clark, Esq. Particularly, the Author directs the reader
to Carol V. Clark, 2016 Judicial Update, 2016 REAL PROP. LAW INST. (Institute of
Continuing Legal Education in Georgia) (2015).
1. REALTYTRAC, Georgia Real Estate Statistics & Foreclosure Trends Summary,
RealtyTrac.com, http://www.realtytrac.com/statsandtrends/ga (last visited Aug. 22, 2016).
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II. LEGISLATION

The 2016 Regular Session of the 153rd Georgia General Assembly
convened on January 11, 2016, and adjourned sine die on March 24,
2016.2 During the session, foreclosure no longer appeared to be at the
forefront of the bills brought to committee or considered on the floor.
There was no legislation signed by the governor that directly amended
the Real Property Code, 3 but legislation was enacted pertaining to other
areas of the law, and that legislation directly affects the practice of real
property law.
Senate Bill 290,4 although a revision to the Insurance Code5 rather
than a change to specific real property law provisions, is germane to any
attorney who handles the collection of title insurance premiums, advises
clients as to title insurance, or adjusts title insurance losses. The Georgia
Department of Insurance (the Insurance Department) had traditionally
not required Georgia attorneys to be licensed as insurance agents even
though closing attorneys, by nature of their role in closing a sale of real
property, advise clients and others about title insurance and regularly
collect insurance premiums during the closing. The Insurance Department issued an opinion letter in April 2000 exempting attorneys from
licensing requirements based on the exclusions found in the definition for
"attorney" at Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.) section 3323-1(b)(1).6 The need for legislation arose because, in wake of the
creation of regulations by the Federal Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau,7 the Insurance Department advised several mortgage lenders
that Georgia did, in fact, require attorneys to be licensed under Georgia
law in order to issue title policies.8
Senate Bill 290 was enacted to address the Insurance Department's
change of position by revising O.C.G.A. § 33-23-49 to include Georgia
attorneys in the statute's list of exempted persons. The amendment uses
the definition within O.C.G.A § 33-23-1(b)(1): "An attorney at law

2. GEORGIA COURTS JOURNAL, http://journal.georgiacourts.gov/article/2016-enactedlegislation (last visited Aug. 22, 2016).
3. O.C.G.A. tit. 44 (2010).
4. Ga. S. Bill 290, Reg. Sess. (2016) (amending O.C.G.A. tit. 33 ch. 23 (2013 & Supp.
2016)).
5. O.C.G.A. tit. 33 (2013 & Supp. 2016).
6. O.C.G.A. § 33-23-1(b)(1) (2013 & Supp. 2016); William L. Phalen, III, RPLS
Legislative Committee: It's A Long, Long Journey (Real Property Law Institute Materials,
May 12-14).
7. See 12 U.S.C. § 5511 (2010).
8. Phalen, III, supra note 6.
9. O.C.G.A. § 33-23-4 (2013 & Supp. 2016).
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admitted to practice in this state, when handling the collections of
premiums or advising clients as to insurance as a function incidental to
the practice of law or who adjusts losses which are incidental to the
practice of his or her profession" is not included within the definition of
"agent, subagent, [or] counselor." 10 The end result is that O.C.G.A. § 3323-4(h)(2)(B)" expressly exempts attorneys from the requirement that

they become licensed insurance agents. 12
In a further step toward revising Georgia law to reflect the digital age
and providing instruction on how digital images, traditional documents,
and images of instruments are to be properly certified for recording with
the clerk of court, H.R. Bill 100413 amended Title 15 of the Georgia Code' 4
to provide standardized directions and requirements.
The amendment provides that, in order for maps, plats, or
condominium plans to be recordable, the document must now conform to
specific requirements. The document to be recorded must include a
caption containing the following: the county, city, town, municipality, or
village where the property lies; the names of all owners of the property;
the type of document being recorded, such as whether the image is a
subdivision or condominium plat, condominium site plan, condominium
plot plan, or condominium floor plan; the name of the subdivision, if any;
the name of the condominium, if the document concerns a condominium;
identification of any applicable units, pods, blocks, lots, or other
designation of the subdivision or condominium; the identity of the
developers; all land districts and land lots reflected on the map, plat, or
plan; the date of preparation or revision date; the identity, license or
registration number, and contact information of the land surveyor. 15
Furthermore, the image's pages must be numbered if it contains multiple
pages.16

The amendment also requires that each document provide a "surveyor
certification box" containing the surveyor's certification of whether the
map, plat, or plan has been approved by the applicable municipal, county,
or other governing body, and, if no approval is required, that the
applicable body has affirmed, in writing, that no approval is required,
including the name and date of approval or waiver of the approval.' 7 Lest

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

O.C.G.A. § 33-23-1(b)(1) (2013 & Supp. 2016).
O.C.G.A. § 33-23-4(h)(2)(B) (2013 & Supp. 2016).
Id.
Ga. H.R. Bill 1004, Reg. Sess. (2016).
O.C.G.A. tit. 15 (2015 & Supp. 2016).
O.C.G.A § 15-6-67(b)(1)(A)-(L) (Supp. 2016).
Id.
O.C.G.A § 15-6-67(b)(2) (Supp. 2016).
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a surveyor wants to cut corners, the amendment creates a crime
punishable as a misdemeanor 5 if a surveyor makes a fraudulent
certification.19 Also required is a "filing information box" of not less than
three square inches, in the upper left-hand corner, which shall be
reserved for the clerk to append filing information. 20 Any image of maps,
plats, or plans must comply with the minimum standards purveyed in
the regulations of the State Board of Registration for Professional
Engineers and Land Surveyors. 21 It must be an electronic image of a
single page, certified and presented to the clerk electronically in
conformance with the rules of the Georgia Superior Court Clerks'
Cooperative Authority.22

House Bill 5123 amended O.C.G.A. § 48-4-40,24 adding sums to be paid
to redeem property after it has been foreclosed by taxing authorities for
unpaid ad valorem taxes. In the past, purchasers at tax foreclosure sales
and those parties redeeming the property from sale were often at odds as
to how to calculate the total sum to be paid to redeem property, as the
statute was silent about whether charges other than the taxes and
penalties paid at the sale, taxes paid after the sale of the property, plus
a statutory premium were required to effect redemption by the proper
party. 25 The amendment provides for additional sums to be paid to
properly redeem real property from a tax sale, and it directs payment of
property owners or condominium association fees or assessments paid by
26
the tax deed purchaser after purchase of the property at the tax sale.
The amendment curtails any argument about what is required to
properly redeem property and protects those who purchase such
properties from unexpected and unfair loss.

-

18. A misdemeanor is punishable in Georgia by up to 12 months imprisonment and up
to a $1000 fine. See O.C.G.A. § 17-10-3 (2013 & Supp. 2016).
19. O.C.G.A. § 15-6-67(d) (Supp. 2016).
20. O.C.G.A. § 15-6-67(b)(3) (Supp. 2016).
21. O.C.G.A. § 15-6-67(b)(4) (Supp. 2016). See also GA. COMP. R. & REGS. ch. 180-1 to
13 (2016).
22. O.C.G.A. § 15-6-67(b)(4) (Supp. 2016).
23. Ga. H.R. 51, Reg. Sess. (2016).
24. O.C.G.A. § 48-4-40 (2010 & Supp. 2016).
25. The statute continues to require payment of a premium of 20% of the bid amount
for the first year or fraction of the year of purchase and 10% of the bid amount for each year
thereafter. See O.C.G.A. § 48-4-42 (2010 & Supp. 2016).
26. O.C.G.A. § 48-4-42(a) (Supp. 2016).
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27

While the Georgia appellate courts issued several decisions concerning
eminent domain, the decisions largely clarified existing law concerning
the right to take property, petitions to set aside the taking, and awards
for attorney fees and costs of litigation. Three cases of note concern
issues related to the duty to pay just and adequate compensation for a
temporary taking, the right to bring a condemnation action even if a
contractual dispute is pending for the same subject matter, and the right
of entry.
In Fincher Road Investments, LLLP v. City of Canton,28 the City of
Canton (the City) filed a petition for condemnation and deposited its
initial estimate of compensation in the amount of $787,400. Claiming
the taking was improper for a number of reasons, Fincher Road
Investments, LLLP (Fincher) filed a petition to set aside the declaration
of taking. The petition was initially dismissed because Fincher failed to
give the City notice of the hearing fifteen days before it commenced, as
required by statute. In an earlier appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals
determined the trial court had the discretion to hear a petition to set
aside, even though the rule nisi for the hearing on the merits of that
29
petition was not served on the City a full fifteen days before the hearing.
On the day the remittitur was issued for the earlier interlocutory
appeal, the City filed a motion to dismiss the taking. Therein, the City
claimed that Fincher's property was no longer necessary for public use.
The City also filed a dismissal, relinquished all rights to the property,
and asked that the clerk completely refund its deposit of just and
adequate compensation. Fincher filed a motion in opposition, asserting
entitlement to compensation for the loss of the property while the City's
taking was effective. Fincher also sought attorney fees and costs of
litigation. The trial court granted Fincher's motion for fees and costs, but
denied its request for compensation related to the temporary taking. A
second petition for interlocutory appeal resulted in this decision.30
Citing the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution,31 the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the decision

27. This section was authored by Ivy N Cadle, shareholder in the firm of Baker,
Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, Pd, Macon, Georgia. Adjunct Professor of Law,
Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law. University of Georgia (B.S., cum laude,
2000; M.Acc., 2002); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 2007); CPA,
2008. Member, State Bar of Georgia.
28. 334 Ga. App. 502, 779 S.E.2d 717 (2015).
29. Id. at 503, 779 S.E.2d at 718-19.
30. Id. at 503-04,779 S.E.2d at 719.
31. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
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of the trial court and held that Fincher was entitled to compensation for
the temporary taking of property. 32 The court of appeals cited precedent
of the Supreme Court of the United States to explain that "'the
government may elect to abandon its intrusion' . . . [however], even such

temporary takings are not 'different in kind from permanent takings, for
which the Constitution clearly requires compensation."' 33 Because the
City elected to acquire the property by filing a declaration of taking, a
method of taking that immediately transfers title to the City upon the
filing of the petition and deposit of compensation, the court of appeals
held that Fincher was entitled to compensation for loss of the property
during the time the City held title. 34
The trial court accepted the City's argument that O.C.G.A. § 22-1-1235
limited Fincher's recovery to attorney fees and costs of litigation, and
that the recovery of attorney fees and costs barred Fincher from receiving
compensation for the temporary taking.3 6 When examining the trial
court's decision, the court of appeals rejected the trial court's reasoning
that compensation for the temporary taking, in addition to attorney fees
and costs, would be a windfall for the property owner. 37 Instead, the
court of appeals reasoned that the 2006 Landowner's Bill of Rights 38
expanded private property protections, and the court held the City's
statutory obligation to pay attorney fees and costs of litigation in no way
eliminated the City's duty to provide compensation for a taking, even a
taking that is ultimately abandoned. 39 Therefore, the judgment of the
trial court was affirmed in part and reversed in part. 40
In White v. Ringgold Telephone Co.,41 Ringgold Telephone Company
(Ringgold Telephone) and Brian White voluntarily entered into an
easement agreement. Under the terms of the easement, Ringgold
Telephone could place telecommunication equipment on White's property
for the consideration of providing White's residence and office with
NexTV video and internet service at no charge. 42 The agreement
required Ringgold Telephone to provide service until it "sells, transfers,

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Fincher, 334 Ga. App. at 504-05, 779 S.E.2d at 719-20.
Id. at 505-06, 779 S.E.2d at 719-20.
Id. at 506, 779 S.E.2d at 721.
O.C.G.A. § 22-1-12 (Supp. 2016).
Fincher, 334 Ga. App. at 507-08, 779 S.E.2d at 722.
Id. at 508, 779 S.E.2d at 722.
Ga. H.R. Bill 1313, Reg. Sess., 2015 Ga. Laws 444.
Fincher, 334 Ga. App. at 508, 779 S.E.2d at 722.
Id. at 509, 779 S.E.2d at 723.
334 Ga. App. 325, 779 S.E.2d 378 (2015).
Id. at 326, 779 S.E.2d at 379-80.
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assigns, disposes of, ceases operation of or stops Ringgold's NexTV
service television product and/or internet service." 43 In 2012, service was
interrupted, and White filed a complaint seeking damages for breach of
contract and a declaratory judgment that would cancel the easement and
require removal of the equipment. While the parties engaged in
discovery, Ringgold Telephone filed a petition for condemnation on the
parcel in question. 44
White moved to dismiss the condemnation on the grounds that
Ringgold Telephone's contractual right to secure the property precluded
the filing of a condemnation petition. The trial court denied White's
motion to dismiss and appointed a special master. Proceedings before
the special master revealed that White and Ringgold Telephone
negotiated a voluntary sale of the property, but White could not convey
the property with clear title. The special master returned a judgment
condemning the property upon payment of $3,974.69 into the court's
registry. The trial court adopted the finding of the special master, and
this appeal followed.45
On appeal, White argued the trial court erred in three ways when it
denied the motion to dismiss Ringgold Telephone's petition to condemn:
(1) because Ringgold Telephone failed to establish its inability to secure
the property by contract as contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 22-1-6;46 (2)
because Ringgold Telephone's contractual rights to the property were
being litigated in a separate action; and (3) because Ringgold Telephone
failed to show the taking was necessary.47 The court of appeals held
White's first argument failed because a condemnor must only make an
effort to secure the property by agreement. 48 Evidence at the hearing
showed Ringgold Telephone attempted to secure the property, but the
parties could not agree on terms, namely the state of title to be
transferred.4 9 Accordingly, it was held that Ringgold Telephone fulfilled
its statutory duty under O.C.G.A. § 22-1-6 to attempt to acquire the
property by agreement.50 The court addressed the second argument
concerning the contractual dispute with well-settled Georgia law that
condemnation actions are separate from suits for damages and that suits

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 326, 779 S.E.2d at 380.
Id. at 326-27, 779 S.E.2d at 380.
Id. at 327-28, 779 S.E.2d at 379-80.
O.C.G.A. § 22-1-6 (1982).
White, 334 Ga. App. at 328, 779 S.E.2d at 381.
Id. at 328-29, 779 S.E.2d at 381.
Id. at 329, 779 S.E.2d at 381.

50. Id.
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for damages are no reason to delay condemnation actions.5 1 The court
explained that this treatment was logical, because the relevant evidence
in a condemnation case is strictly limited, and separate suits for different
kinds of damages are not uncommon. 52 In rejecting White's third
argument, the court cited uncontroverted evidence that Ringgold
Telephone was currently occupying the land taken, that the land taken
was on an elevation not susceptible to flooding, and that the land was
53
necessary for the provision of safe, reliable telephone service.
54
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed.
In Jones v. Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC, 55 Sabal Trail
Transmission, LLC (Sabal) was hired to construct and operate a natural
gas pipeline that stretched from Alabama to Florida. In order to complete
the survey of the proposed pipeline route, Sabal asked property owner
Sandra Jones for permission to enter and survey her land, which Jones
refused. As a result, Sabal filed an action for interlocutory injunctive
relief and a declaratory judgment authorizing entry over Jones'
property.5 6 In its pleadings, Sabal cited O.C.G.A. § 22-3-88,57 which
allows those engaged in constructing or operating natural gas pipelines
to exercise the power of eminent domain.5 8 The trial court entered
judgment in favor of Sabal, and Jones appealed.59
On appeal, Jones raised several issues. First, Jones contended that
the trial court erred in consolidating the hearings for the interlocutory
injunction and the declaratory judgment because the notice of hearing
Because both the
only mentioned the interlocutory injunction.60
were mentioned
judgment
declaratory
and
the
interlocutory injunction
of appeals
the
court
the
hearing,
at
both
parties
by
without objection
notice
defective
the
concerning
any
arguments
found Jones had waived
62
61
not
authorize
does
Gas
Act
Natural
the
claimed
Jones
also
of hearing.
entry, and the federal statute preempts state law in this area. 63 After

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id. at 329, 779 S.E.2d at 381-82.
Id. at 330, 779 S.E.2d at 382.
Id. at 331, 779 S.E.2d at 382.
336 Ga. App. 513, 784 S.E.2d 865 (2016).
Id. at 513, 784 S.E.2d at 866-67.
O.C.G.A. § 22-3-88 (Supp. 2016).
Jones, 336 Ga. App. at 513-14, 784 S.E.2d at 867.
Id. at 514, 784 S.E.2d at 867.
Id.
Id. at 515, 784 S.E.2d at 867-68.
15 U.S.C. § 717 (2005).
Jones, 336 Ga. App. at 516, 784 S.E.2d at 868.
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holding that Jones waived this argument because it was not brought
forth in the court below, the court of appeals adopted analysis from a
similar unreported case, which held that natural gas regulation is not an
entirely preempted field and that the preemption claim in the instant
case involves a choice of federal law, rather than a choice of forum. 64 As
such, Jones' failure to raise the claim below resulted in a waiver.6 5 Jones
also argued that Sabal could not properly obtain a right of entry under
O.C.G.A. § 22-3-88 because Sabal had not obtained a certificate of public
convenience and necessity from the Federal Energy and Regulatory
Commission (FERC).66 After looking at the legislative history of the
Georgia statute, the court held the plain terms of O.C.G.A. § 22-3-88 do
not condition the grant of eminent domain on the possession of any
certificate or permit.6 7 As an example of what the legislature did not do,
the court pointed to O.C.G.A. § 22-3-82(c), 68 which affords a petroleum
pipeline company the right of reasonable access for surveying after it
obtains a certificate of convenience and necessity.6 9 Based on the above

cited authorities, the court affirmed the decision of the trial court.70

IV.

EASEMENTS, COVENANTS AND BOUNDARIES7 1

It is a well-established principal of law that easements and
declarations of covenants are viewed as contracts, and courts apply the
usual rules of contract construction in interpreting both types of
documents. On the other hand, actions to establish boundary lines
between properties require a factual determination.
In Albenberg v. Szalay, 72 the Georgia Court of Appeals upheld an
express easement for ingress and egress to a landlocked property, 73 but
it determined the easement could not be "varied or expanded on the basis
of an implied easement or a utilities easement." 74 Here, landlocked
64. Id.
65. Id. at 517, 784 S.E.2d at 868.
66. Id. at 517, 784 S.E.2d at 869.
67. Id.
68. O.C.G.A. § 22-3-82(c) (2015).
69. Jones, 336 Ga. App. at 517, 784 S.E.2d at 869.
70. Id. at 518, 784 S.E.2d at 869.
71. This section was authored by Sarah-Nell H. Walsh, shareholder in the firm of
Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Atlanta, Georgia. University of
Virginia (B.A., 2001); William and Mary School of Law (J.D., 2004); and Sarah Carrier,
University of Georgia (B.B.A., 2013); Georgetown University Law Center (J.D. Candidate,
2017).
72. 332 Ga. App. 665, 774 S.E.2d 730 (2015).
73. Id. at 665, 774 S.E.2d at 732.
74. Id.
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Albenberg filed suit against adjoining property owners to allow the
construction of a road across their property. The parties had a common
predecessor in title, whose warranty deed to Albenberg described a
permanent, twenty-foot easement for accessing the property. The deed
also allowed improvements to the easement as long as they were "solely
for the purpose of making, maintaining, repairing, modifying or replacing
a road for ingress and egress." 75

Albenberg argued this deed language reflected the easement grantor's
intention to provide vehicular access to her property and that the trial
court had subsequently erred in limiting her to the deed's defined "twenty
feet in width." 76

The court of appeals held the "unambiguous" deed

language referenced only the creation and maintenance of the twentyfoot easement itself, not the implied creation of a road as Albenberg
sought.77 The court of appeals held that "where the parties have
established the actual location and dimensions of an easement, that
determination is the controlling factor under Georgia law,"

78

and that "an

easement with a fixed location cannot be substantially changed or
relocated without the express or implied consent" of both the servient and
dominant owners.79
Additionally, the court upheld summary judgment against Albenberg
80
on her claims for easement by implication, prescription, and utility. The

court ruled that implied easements can only arise where "necessary" to
the landowner's enjoyment of her land because there is "no other suitable
outlet."8 1 Albenberg provided no evidence she could not use her express
easement "without unreasonable difficulty." 82 Thus, creating a road was
not sufficiently necessary. Also, Albenberg's claim for easement by
prescription 83 was denied based on her own admission that she had not
used the easement tract since 1994.84 Regarding her claim for easement

by utility, the court held Albenberg could not acquire an implied
easement by utility because utility companies have eminent domain
75. Id. at 666, 774 S.E.2d at 732.
76. Id. at 667-68, 774 S.E.2d 733-34.
77. Id. at 667, 774 S.E.2d at 733.
78. Id. at 667-68, 774 S.E.2d at 733 (quoting Sloan v. Sarah Rhodes, LLC, 274 Ga. 879,
880, 560 S.E.2d 653 (2002)).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 668-70, 774 S.E.2d at 734-35.
81. Id. at 667-68, 774 S.E.2d at 733.
82. Id. at 669, 774 S.E.2d at 733.
83. O.C.G.A. § 44-9-1 (2010) ("The right of private way over another's land may arise ...
from prescription by seven years' uninterrupted use through improved lands or by 20 years'
use through wild lands .... .").
84. Albenberg, 332 Ga. App. at 670, 774 S.E.2d at 735.
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power, which would have allowed them to acquire any necessary
easements. 85
In Land USA, LLC v. GeorgiaPower Co., 86 the Georgia Supreme Court
reversed and remanded the trial court's determination that Georgia
Power had a valid easement, where the easement had been granted by a
foreclosed landowner post-tax sale.87 Relying on state barment statutes,
the court held that the easement was extinguished when the statutory
redemption period terminated.88 While the easement grantor retained
possession in the property for one year after the tax sale, the grantor did
not have "sufficient interest therein" to grant a perpetual easement.89
The trial court previously upheld Georgia Power's express easement to
land within twenty-five feet of their electric line.9 0 In holding the
opposite, the supreme court relied on O.C.G.A § 44-9-791 to indicate
implied extinguishment once the foreclosed owner lost the right to
redeem their property. 92 The statute states that easements recorded
prior to tax fi. fa. recordation are not extinguished. 93 Thus, the court
determined this "implicitly provides that any easement not so recorded
is extinguished if the property is not redeemed." 94 In this case, because
the facts were undisputed that the tax deed was recorded before Georgia
Power recorded their express easement, the easement was extinguished
once the tax deed buyer's "defeasible fee interest" ripened into fee simple
title.95
Turning to covenants, the Georgia Court of Appeals, in Castle Point
Homeowners Ass'n v. Simmons,96 held there was a genuine issue of fact
as to whether a homeowner was bound by homeowner's association
(HOA) restrictions under the theory of implied covenants.97 Upon
homeowner Simmons' noncompliance with restrictive covenants, the
HOA brought suit to enjoin violations and require removal of nonconforming features. These violations included Simmons' failure to
install a sidewalk on her property's street side. The HOA pointed out
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
297 Ga. 237, 773 S.E.2d 236 (2015).
Id. at 237-38, 773 S.E.2d at 238.
Id. at 241, 773 S.E.2d at 240.
Id. at 240, 773 S.E.2d at 239.
Id. at 238-39, 773 S.E.2d at 238.
O.C.G.A § 44-9-7 (1982).
Land USA, LLC, 297 Ga. at 241, 773 S.E.2d at 240.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 242, 773 S.E.2d at 240-41.
333 Ga. App. 501, 773 S.E.2d 806 (2015).
Id. at 506-07, 773 S.E.2d at 810.
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that nine homes with sidewalks had already been constructed when
Simmons purchased her property in the fourteen-lot subdivision.
Nevertheless, the trial court granted Simmons summary judgment
because the covenants were recorded after her security deed was
recorded.98 The court of appeals reversed, finding that, although the
covenants were not in Simmons' chain of title, restrictions may go
"beyond the express restrictions contained in the deeds to the
purchasers" when the land at issue was subdivided under a "general plan
or scheme."9 9
The court found "several facts" which could demonstrate the existence
For example, Simmons' security deed
of an implied covenant.100
referenced a "Final Subdivision Plat for Castle Point Phase 1."01 Thus,
the HOA showed Simmons had constructive notice of the common
grantor's general scheme. 102 Additionally, Simmons joined the HOA and
03
paid annual dues upon purchase of her property.1 She also referenced
the Castle Point development when she obtained a loan on the
property.104 These facts supported an implied covenant such that the
05
court reversed summary judgment.
0
In Marks v. Flowers Crossing Community Ass'n,1 the homeowners
appealed a jury verdict in favor of Flowers Crossing Community
Association Inc. (the Association). 0 7 On appeal, the Georgia Court of
Appeals vacated a judgment in favor of the Association based on
restrictive covenant violations, past due assessments, attorney's fees,
and injunctive relief.108 The court held a new trial was necessary because
9
certain covenant violations were time-barred.10 O.C.G.A. § 9-3-29110
states that the statute of limitations for a breach of restrictive covenants
is generally two years after the right accrues and four years for past-due

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 503-06, 773 S.E.2d at 808-09.
Id. at 505, 773 S.E.2d at 809.
Id. at 506, 773 S.E.2d at 809.
Id. at 506, 773 S.E.2d at 809-810.
Id. at 506, 773 S.E.2d at 810.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 506-07, 773 S.E.2d at 810.
333 Ga. App. 476, 773 S.E.2d 814 (2015).
Id. at 476, 773 S.E.2d at 816.
Id. at 476-79, 773 S.E.2d at 816-17.
Id. at 482-83, 773 S.E.2d at 820.
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-29 (2007).

REAL PROPERTY

2016]

243

assessments.111 The right of action for a covenant breach accrues
"immediately upon the violation." 112
The Association claimed the homeowners' violations were "chronically
repeated and continuing" to create a new cause of action each time.113
The court denied this argument, stating "the continuing violation rule
applies only where there are separateand distinct repetitive acts giving
rise to the cause of action."11 4 Here, the actions at issue were the
homeowners' failure to paint a new garage door and failure to maintain
window screens. 115 The court determined these were fixtures and thus
could not "arise out of wholly different facts."1 16 Therefore, pursuant to
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-29, the right of action began accruing immediately upon
violation.117 Regarding the Association's remaining claims, the court
held the new trial was needed because it could not be determined which
amount of the jury award was based on time-barred claims. 118 The
amount for past-due assessments was also remanded, as the court found
the Association's evidence to be confusing enough to have misled the jury
because it also may have included time-barred amounts.119
In McLeod v.

Clements,120 the Georgia

Supreme

Court granted

certiorari to address the question of whether covenants running with the
land bind subsequent owners "with or without notice."1 21 In this case,
landowner McLeod brought suit against Clements, the purchaser of an
adjoining property, for failure to provide him free well water pursuant to
a previous landowner's agreement. McLeod relied on a 1971 written
agreement that ensured those living on his property would receive free
water for the duration of their lives, which was a covenant running with
the land. The property changed hands many times, and another
agreement was formed in 1996. This agreement stated water would be
provided to those living on McLeod's property, so long as a monthly
electricity and well maintenance fee was provided. Clements affirmed he
was aware of the latter agreement, but not the 1971 agreement. 122

111.
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113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Marks, 333 Ga. App. at 479-80, 773 S.E.2d at 818.
Id.
Id. at 480-81, 773 S.E.2d at 818.
Id. at 481, 773 S.E.2d at 818.
Id.
Id. at 480, 773 S.E.2d at 818.
Id. at 481-82, 773 S.E.2d at 819.
Id. at 482, 773 S.E.2d at 820.
Id. at 484, 773 S.E.2d at 820.
297 Ga. 371, 774 S.E.2d 102 (2015).
Id. at 371, 774 S.E.2d at 102-03.
Id. at 371-72, 774 S.E.2d at 103-04.
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The court of appeals looked only at the 1971 free water agreement and
determined it was a covenant running with the land, but could not be
enforced against Clements because he was a bona fide purchaser who
took title without notice of the agreement.1 23 Because the covenant was
recorded outside Clements' chain of title, he had no actual or constructive
notice of the 1971 agreement.1 24 Previous Georgia case law stated that
covenants running with the land could bind subsequent purchasers "with
or without notice."1 25 In this case, the supreme court clarified this phrase
to mean that the covenants would only bind purchasers "with actual
notice or constructive notice, but not with no notice at all."1 26
In Smith v. Mitchell County,127 landowners appealed the trial court's
decision that Mitchell County's boundary line was correct because
Mitchell County had acquired title to the disputed property by adverse
possession. 128 The dispute arose because each of the adjacent property
owners had land surveys identifying different boundary line locations.1 29
The trial court submitted the matter to a special master pursuant to
O.C.G.A. § 23-3-63.130 The court ultimately adopted the special master's
finding that Mitchell County's boundary determination was correct.131
The special master found Mitchell County had acquired quiet title to the
disputed lot based on their "public, continuous, exclusive, uninterrupted,
and peaceable" use of the property for over seven years, as prescribed by
O.C.G.A. § 44-5-160.132 On appeal, the landowners challenged the trial
court's decision on the grounds that there had been no evidentiary
hearing, the evidence used was lacking, and a jury trial should have been
granted. 133 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's final decree on
all three issues. 134 First, the court held the special master had "complete
jurisdiction" over the matter, including the authority to set a hearing
request deadline. 135 The landowners failed to meet this deadline and thus
123. Id. at 373, 774 S.E.2d at 104.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 374, 774 S.E.2d at 104.
127. 334 Ga. App. 374, 779 S.E.2d 410 (2015).
128. Id. at 378, 779 S.E.2d at 414.
129. Id. at 375, 779 S.E.2d at 412.
130. Id. at 376, 779 S.E.2d at 412. "The Quiet Title Act requires a trial court to appoint
a special master (O.C.G.A. § 23-3-63), and requires the special master to make a report of
the special master's findings to the trial court." Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 379, 779 S.E.2d at 414-15.
133. Id. at 374-75, 779 S.E.2d at 411.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 377, 779 S.E.2d at 413.
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waived their right. 136 Next, the court denied the landowners' argument
that there was insufficient evidence that Mitchell County possessed the
disputed lot.1 37 The court ruled that they need not even address

discrepancies in the surveys, because the special master correctly
concluded Mitchell County had acquired the land by prescription. 1
V. FORECLOSURE1 39

The Georgia courts addressed some long-standing questions regarding
foreclosure procedure during the survey period. First, the Georgia
Supreme Court declared that in certain circumstances, a lender can
pursue a guarantor for a deficiency judgment even where the lender
failed to satisfy the Georgia confirmation requirements necessary for
seeking a deficiency against a borrower. 140 In PNC Bank, N.A. v.
Smith,141 a mortgage lender sought to enforce personal guaranties
following an unconfirmed foreclosure sale where the text of the
guaranties included: (1) a pledge to remain liable on the indebtedness
irrespective of the borrower's own liability; and (2) an express waiver of
their legal and equitable defenses aside from payment of the
indebtedness.1 4 2 Under these specific circumstances, the court held that
although the specific procedures set forth in O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161143 for
confirmation of foreclosure sales constitute a condition precedent to the
seeking of a deficiency judgment against guarantors, express waivers like
those included in the guaranties at issue were sufficient to waive the
condition precedent for guarantors.1 4 4
In his concurrence, Justice Nahmias noted that the conclusion reached
by the court that borrowers and guarantors were both debtors within the
meaning of the statute would likely also mean a waiver of the
confirmation statute protections by the borrower would be legally
effective as well. 145 While this issue remains an open one, Justice
Nahmias suggested that the Georgia legislature resolve it by banning or

136. Id.
137. Id. at 378, 779 S.E.2d at 413-14.
138. Id. at 379-80, 779 S.E.2d at 415.
139. This section is authored by Dylan W. Howard, shareholder in the firm of Baker,
Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Atlanta, Georgia. Yale University (B.A.,
1999); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2002).
140. See O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161 (2010).
141. 298 Ga. 818, 785 S.E.2d 505 (2016).
142. Id. at 819, 785 S.E.2d at 506.
143. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161.
144. PNC Bank, 298 Ga. at 819, 785 S.E.2d at 507.
145. Id. at 824, 785 S.E.2d at 510 (Nahmias, J., concurring).
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regulating such waivers before they become commonplace in Georgia
security deeds. 146
Next, the Supreme Court of Georgia turned its attention back to an
issue that appeared to have been resolved by an earlier decision, 147 that
is, namely whether a borrower has standing to challenge an assignment
of the security deed. In Ames v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.,148 the
supreme court affirmed prior decisions holding that the borrowers in the
case lacked standing to sue.1 49 The court further clarified, however, that
a borrower may be a third-party beneficiary of certain parts of the
assignment-"namely, the parts that transfer any rights and protections
given to the debtor under the security deed," but this conclusion did not
provide the borrower with the right to dispute the assignment itself.150
"[T]he debtor can vindicate all of the rights it had (and continues to have)
under the deed that has been transferred by suing the assignee that
claims to have taken ownership of the deed and its corresponding
obligations."'15 In short, an assignment does not provide a borrower with
any new rights not provided by the underlying security deed.1 52
Responding to an argument by the borrower that the assignment was
executed after a power of attorney granted by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to the transferor expired (and thus the
foreclosing servicer was stepping on the toes of the FDIC who allegedly
retained authority over the loan including the authority to modify it), the
court determined that the only proper remedy was for the borrower to
raise the issue with the FDIC so that the FDIC could intercede if it felt
its rights had been violated.' 5
In a situation where, for example, the entity attempting to foreclose
has no legitimate claim to the security deed, such as where the alleged
assignment was fraudulent, calling the foreclosure to the attention of
the true deed holder would be expected to lead to remedial action by
54
the true holder.1

Finally, the court noted that a debtor could have standing to challenge
the validity of an assignment indirectly if the invalid assignment violated

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 825, 785 S.E.2d at 510 (Nahmias, J., concurring).
Montgomery v. Bank of Am., 321 Ga. App. 343, 740 S.E.2d 434 (2013).
298 Ga. 732, 783 S.E.2d 614 (2016).
Id. at 735, 783 S.E.2d at 617.
Id. at 739, 783 S.E.2d at 620.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 739-40, 783 S.E.2d at 620-21.
Id. at 740, 783 S.E.2d at 621.
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a protection provided to the borrower by statute and thereby injured the
borrower. 15 5 The court held that the borrower in the case at bar had not
stated such a claim because the lender had no statutory obligation to
identify the current security deed holder in the foreclosure notice. 156
Since the lender had satisfied the terms of O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2(a),1 57
there was no statutory violation and the borrower simply lacked any
authority to challenge the assignment on any ground. 18
Along similar lines, the borrower in Stoudemire v. HSBC Bank USA159
argued the rule that only parties can challenge an assignment should not
apply to facially void assignments. 6 0 The Georgia Court of Appeals
acknowledged case law stating that a void contract "is one that has no
effect whatsoever and is incapable of being ratified" and distinguished
void contracts from voidable contracts that are merely unenforceable at
the election of the injured party.16 1 The court ultimately refrained from
deciding the issue; however, as it concluded that the borrower's
challenges to the assignment (including challenges to the validity of the
notary seal and the attestation of the assignment, as well as a challenge
to the authority of the corporate representatives who executed the
assignment) were not errors that would render the assignment facially
void.1 62 The ability of a borrower to challenge a facially void assignment
therefore remains an open question that will likely be addressed by the
Georgia appellate courts in the near future.
In Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Molina-Salas,163 the Georgia Court of
Appeals addressed a wrongful foreclosure claim by a borrower based on
an error in two of the four weekly published foreclosure
advertisements.1 64 Due to what the court termed a typographical error,
the legal description of the collateral being foreclosed contained a
reference to an incorrect land district. A foreclosure notice containing
the error was published twice before being corrected.1 65 The borrower
alleged the foreclosure was wrongful because of the error itself and
155. Id.
156. Id. at 741, 783 S.E.2d at 621.
157. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2 (2010 & Supp. 2016).
158. Ames, 298 Ga. at 741-42, 783 S.E.2d at 621-22.
159. 333 Ga. App. 374, 776 S.E.2d 483 (2015).
160. Id. at 375, 776 S.E.2d at 485.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 376, 776 S.E.2d at 484.
163. 332 Ga. App. 641, 774 S.E.2d 712 (2015).
164. A Georgia statute requires that a foreclosure notice be published for four
consecutive weeks immediately prior to the foreclosure sale date. See O.C.G.A § 44-14-162
(2010 & 2016 Supp.).
165. Wells FargoBank, N.A., 332 Ga. App. at 642, 774 S.E.2d at 714.
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because the lender failed to send her an amended copy of the
advertisement. 166 The trial court denied the lender's motion for summary
judgment on these issues, and the court of appeals accepted the issue on
an application for interlocutory appeal and then overturned the trial
court's decision.16 7 The court of appeals first concluded that a foreclosure
is defective as a matter of law based on an error in the advertisement,
only if the advertisement fails to include the information required by the
statute (including but not limited to the legal description of the
property).16 8 Because the advertisement at issue "contained an otherwise
accurate description of the property, its correct physical address, its
recording data by plat book and page number, and the recording data of
the security deed," the court held that voiding the foreclosure based on
the typographical error would "substitute shadow over substance."169
This, the court said, it would not do.1 70 Next, the court determined that
while a foreclosure not defective as a matter of law can be the subject of
a wrongful foreclosure suit where the alleged error caused a chilling of
the bid, the plaintiff in the case at bar failed to demonstrate any evidence
of bid chilling. 171 Finally, the court held that the error in the published
foreclosure notice could not support a claim that the lender failed to
provide the plaintiff with adequate notice of the sale.172 This argument
failed both because (1) the mailed notice contained the information
required by statute even if one piece of the information was incorrect, and
(2) the plaintiff had shown no injury caused to her by the failure to
provide her with a copy of the corrected advertisement. 173 For these
reasons, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's order and granted
the lender summary judgment on the borrower's wrongful foreclosure
claim.174
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VI. SALE OF REAL PROPERTY 175

In On Line, Inc. v. Wrightsboro Walk, LLC,1 76 the Georgia Court of
Appeals reversed an order granting summary judgment in favor of the
plaintiff where there were material issues as to whether
misrepresentations made by the plaintiff and the defendant's inability to
assume an existing loan allowed termination of the agreement without
penalty to the defendant.' 77 The plaintiff agreed to sell commercial real
property to the defendant for $3.6 million. The purchase and sale
agreement (the Agreement) provided the defendant with a 30-day
inspection period (the Inspection Period) that was to begin on the day the
defendant received multiple documents from the plaintiff.
These
documents included the title insurance policy for the property, all
surveys in the plaintiffs possession, environmental reports for the
property, and income and expense reports. Additionally, as part of the
purchase price, the defendant was required to make attempts to assume
an existing $2 million loan from the plaintiff. If the loan could not be
assumed by the defendant, the Agreement would terminate. The
defendant had the right to terminate the agreement at any time during
the Inspection Period. 178
On August 23, 2013, the plaintiff uploaded numerous documents to an
online storage website and sent an e-mail to the defendant's
representative with access to the documents. 7 9 On August 26, 2013, the
seller sent an e-mail to a real estate agent for the defendant containing
a "Receipt of Documents" (the Receipt), which was not sent with the
original documents. 8 0 The Receipt itemized the documents uploaded
online and contained a separate boxed notation stating the documents
were sent on August 23, 2013, and therefore, the Inspection Period "shall
end September 23, 2013."181 The defendant initialed the Receipt, dated

it August 27, 2013, and returned it to the plaintiff via e-mail
acknowledging the Inspection Period ended on September 23, 2013.
During the Inspection Period, the defendant discovered that although the
plaintiff stated the property was built in 2006, many of the HVAC

175. This section was authored by Alexander F. Koskey, III, associate in the law firm of
Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Atlanta, Georgia.
Samford
University (B.S., 2004); Cumberland School of Law, Samford University (J.D., 2007).
Member, State Bars of Georgia, Florida, and Alabama.
176. 332 Ga. App. 777, 775 S.E.2d 161 (2015).
177. Id. at 777, 775 S.E.2d at 162.
178. Id. at 777-78 n.3, 775 S.E.2d at 162-63 n.3.
179. Id. at 779, 775 S.E.2d at 163.
180. Id.
181. Id.

250

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

systems servicing the property were from 1989. On September 24, 2013,
after the inspection period had expired but while the defendant was still
reviewing the documents produced by the plaintiff, the defendant sent
notice to the plaintiff terminating the Agreement. 182
The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant alleging breach of
the Agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
the plaintiff finding that there were no genuine issues of material fact as
to when the Inspection Period began or whether the defendant had
received all necessary documents from the plaintiff. The trial court did
not address the issue of the defendant's inability to obtain financing or

assume the loan from the plaintiff. The defendant appealed contending
that the plaintiff made material misrepresentations to the defendant and
the defendant could not assume the loan, both of which allowed the
defendant to terminate the Agreement.18 3
The court of appeals began its analysis as to whether the defendant's
inability to assume the existing loan on the property created an issue of
material fact.1 84 The defendant contended the plaintiff made material
misrepresentations as to income and expense reports during the due
diligence period, which prohibited the defendant from providing
necessary documentation to assume the loan. 8 5 The court of appeals
agreed that there were issues of material fact as to whether the plaintiff
made material misrepresentations to the seller, and whether the
inability to assume the loan would have allowed the defendant to
terminate the Agreement. 86
The court also addressed the issue of whether the Inspection Period
began on August 23, 2013.187 The defendant contended the Inspection
Period did not begin on August 23, 2013, as the plaintiff had not yet
produced all documents required under the Agreement.1 88 The court
disagreed and held that the execution of the Receipt by both the plaintiff
and the defendant effectively constituted a modification of the Agreement
as the defendant was under no obligation to sign the Receipt or agree
with the statements made in the Receipt.18 9 Furthermore, the court held
that the defendant could have changed the date on the Receipt to reflect
when the uploaded documents were received by the defendant or that the
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defendant had failed to receive all of the required documents.1 90 Instead,
the defendant's acknowledgement of all terms in the Receipt and return
to the plaintiff constituted a written modification of the Agreement. 191
Accordingly, the court of appeals upheld the trial court's finding that the
defendant's termination of the agreement did not occur during the
Inspection Period.1 92
In RZI Properties,LLC v. Southern REO Associates, LLC,193 the court
of appeals addressed the issue of whether a broker failed to exercise
reasonable care in disclosing to a buyer the final deadline for submission
of proof of funds under a purchase agreement. The plaintiff, RZI
Properties, LLC, retained a brokerage firm, Southern REO Associates,
LLC, to broker the purchase of real property on behalf of the plaintiff.
The seller of the property was SunTrust Mortgage.1 94
On January 4, 2012, after the plaintiff submitted an offer to purchase
the property, the defendant forwarded an e-mail from the seller to the
plaintiff outlining the terms of the agreement, which required the
plaintiff to provide "updated proof of funds within the last 30 days." 95
The defendant also added a message to the plaintiff stating, "we have
accepted contract for $5,000. Please read below and let me know.
Thanks!"196 On January 6, 2012, the plaintiff sent proof of funds to the
defendant that was over thirty days old. The defendant forwarded the
proof of funds to the seller. The seller's broker e-mailed the defendant
and notified her the contract was rejected because the proof of funds was
over thirty days old and agreed to extend the deadline until January 13,
2012. The plaintiff said proof of funds would be provided on January 17,
2012. On January 17, 2012, the seller's broker told the defendant the
agreement would be terminated if proof of funds were not provided by the
end of the day. The proof of funds was provided to the seller on January
18, 2012, and on January 19, 2012, the seller informed the defendant it
97
had accepted another offer to purchase the property.1
The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant alleging the
defendant was negligent in failing to advise the plaintiff of the deadline
to submit updated proof of funds. The trial court granted summary
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judgment in favor of the defendant. 198 In its analysis, the court of appeals
focused on the term "ministerial acts," which is defined under O.C.G.A. §

10-6A-3(12)199 as "those acts described in O.C.G.A.§ 10-6A-14 and such
other acts which do not require the exercise of the broker's or the broker's
affiliated licensee's professional judgment or skill." 2 00 The court noted
that although it was not specifically enumerated as a "ministerial act,"
the failure of the seller to "timely communicate vital information
concerning the status of its offer to purchase the property, is an act that
did not require the exercise of [the defendant's] professional judgment or
skill."201

The court concluded there was no evidence that the defendant
informed the plaintiff of the seller's agreement to extend the deadline to
submit updated proof of funds. 202 Therefore, there was an issue of
material fact as to whether the defendant exercised reasonable care in
performing a "ministerial duty" of informing the seller of new
deadlines. 203 In light of the above analysis, the court determined that the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendant. 20 4
VII. TAXATION OF REAL PROPERTY

20 5

In DLT List, LLC v. M7ven Supportive Housing & Development
Group,206 the Georgia Court of Appeals overturned two pivotal tax cases,
Wester v. United Capital Financial of Atlanta 207 and United Capital
Financialof Atlanta v. American Investment Associates,208 to the extent
that these cases held that a creditor that redeems property from a tax
sale has a first priority claim to excess funds held by the tax
commissioner. 209 The issues appealed by DLT arose from an equitable
interpleader action filed by the Carroll County Tax Commissioner (the

198. Id. at 336, 782 S.E.2d at 731.
199. O.C.G.A. § 10-6A-3(12) (2009).
200. RZI Props. LLC, 336 Ga. App. at 340, 782 S.E.2d at 733.
201. Id. at 341, 782 S.E.2d at 734.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 342, 784 S.E.2d at 734.
204. Id. at 342, 784 S.E.2d at 734-35.
205. This section was authored by Montoya McGee Ho-Sang, attorney in the firm of
Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell, & Berkowitz, PC, Atlanta, Georgia.
Dillard
University (B.A., summa cum laude, 2004); Emory School of Law (J.D., 2007). Member,
State Bars of Georgia and Tennessee.
206. 335 Ga. App. 318, 779 S.E.2d 436 (2015).
207. 282 Ga. App. 392, 638 S.E.2d 779 (2006).
208. 302 Ga. App. 400, 691 S.E.2d 272 (2010).
209. DLT List, LLC, 335 Ga. App. at 320, 779 S.E.2d at 438.
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Tax Commissioner) following the tax sale of real property for unpaid ad
valorem taxes. The interpleader was filed to disburse funds from the tax
sale in excess of those due for taxes and penalties totaling $105,188.91.
The trial court awarded the excess funds to M7VEN Supportive Housing
and Development Group (M7), finding that M7 was the only interested
holder able to make a claim on the funds at the time of the sale. Design
Acquisition, LLC (Design) and DLT List, LLC (DLT) appealed the trial
court order, arguing the court erred in (1) failing to provide them with
notice and a hearing; (2) awarding M7 the funds; and (3) determining
that the Tax Commissioner was not authorized to file an interpleader
action. 210 The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
ruling. 2 11
The undisputed facts were that on June 3, 2014, a tax sale was
conducted on two properties due to the owner's (M7) failure to pay
property taxes. DLT purchased each property for $55,000. On June 6,
2014, the Tax Commissioner notified M7, DLT, and other interested
parties about the excess funds generated from the tax sale. On July 14,
2014, M7 filed a claim for the excess funds with the Tax Commissioner.
On July 28, 2015, DLT filed its tax deeds for each property in the real
estate records. Design (a lienholder against M7) redeemed the properties
from DLT for $66,000 each. Later, in October 2014, Design filed a
declaratory judgment action claiming entitlement to the excess funds
based on its status as redeemer. 212
The Tax Commissioner filed an interpleader action in November 2014,
to which only M7 answered. In January 2015, DLT filed a motion to
dismiss or consolidate the interpleader action with Design's declaratory
judgment action. Design later filed a consent motion to intervene in the
interpleader action. The parties were allowed to brief the issue of rights
to the excess funds. The trial court found that M7 was entitled to the
excess funds because M7 was the only claimant to respond or have an
interest in the properties at the time the Tax Commissioner issued the
excess funds notice in June 2014.213
Design appealed, relying primarily on the appellate court's decisions
in Wester and United Capital, that as the redeemer of the properties, it
had first priority to the excess funds. 214 The Georgia Court of Appeals
determined that Wester and United Capital were wrongly decided;
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215
The court explained
therefore, it affirmed the lower court's decision.
that pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-4-1,216 the county may conduct a sale of
property if the owner neglects to pay county taxes. 217 If the delinquent
property owner or any other party holding an interest in or lien on the
property fails to redeem the property by paying the tax sale purchaser
the purchase price plus any taxes paid and interest, the tax sale
purchaser becomes the fee simple owner after one year. 218 If the
delinquent property owner or lienholders do redeem the property, the
property is quitclaimed back to the property owner and any lienholders
at the time of the tax sale that have not been fully paid (through excess
funds or any other method) retain their pre-sale liens on the property. 219
Under this scenario, the redeeming creditor receives a priority lien for
the redemption price of the property. 220 VWhen a tax sale generates excess
funds, they are to be distributed according to O.C.G.A. § 48-4-5,221 which
explains in pertinent part that "[t]he notice shall state that the excess
funds are available for distribution to the owner or owners as their
222
interests appear in the order of priority in which their interests exist."
In this case, at the time of the tax sale, M7 was the owner and there
were no recorded liens on the property. 223 M7 was the only party to make
a claim for the excess proceeds. 224 Further, Design only presented a claim
for the amount of the redemption price of the properties, but not for its
tax lien. 225 The court of appeals determined that Design's reliance on
Wester and United Capital was misplaced. 226 It determined that Wester
incorrectly expanded the holding of National Tax Funding v. Harpagon
Co. 227 to mean that the redeeming creditor could both redeem the
property and receive the excess funds from the tax sale to pay for the
priority lien created by the redemption. 228 Instead, National Tax
Fundingheld that

215. Id.
216. O.C.G.A. § 48-4-1 (2010).
217. DLT List, LLC, 335 Ga. App. at 321, 779 S.E.2d at 438.
218. Id. at 321, 779 S.E.2d at 439.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. O.C.G.A. § 48-4-5 (2010).
222. DLT List, LLC, 335 Ga. App. at 321-22, 779 S.E.2d at 439 (quoting O.C.G.A.
4-5 (2006)).
223. Id. at 322, 779 S.E.2d at 440.
224. Id. at 322-23, 779 S.E.2d at 440.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 323, 779 S.E.2d at 440.
227. 277 Ga. 41, 586 S.E.2d 235 (2003).
228. DLT List, LLC, 335 Ga. App. at 323, 779 S.E.2d at 440.
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[F]ollowing a tax sale, the holder of a ... lien has two options - it may
either file a claim to collect against any proceeds from the sale, or it
may assert its rights following the tax sale via a statutory claim for
redemption, in which case it obtains a first priority lien on the
property, which it may then enforce by levy and sale. 229
Therefore, the court of appeals overturned Wester and United Capital to
the extent they held the redeeming creditor has a first priority claim on
the excess tax funds for the amount paid to redeem the property. 230 The
court determined that Design was entitled to make a claim against the
excess funds for the amount of the tax lien, with the remainder of the
funds going to M7.231 The court further explained that the redemption
price is not recoverable from the excess funds, but is the priority lien
against the property. 232
The court determined Design's claim did not receive due process
without merit, as its lawyer participated in the telephonic hearing at the
lower level and was given an opportunity to brief the issue after the
hearing. 233 Finally, it found Design's argument that the trial court erred
by finding that the Tax Commissioner did not have discretion to file the
interpleader action without merit as well. 23 4 It opined that the trial court
never made that finding, but instead found that at the point in which the
Tax Commissioner filed the action, it was not necessary because she
should have paid M7 the claim. 235
In Ballard v. Newton County Board of Tax Assessors, 236 the Georgia
Court of Appeals addressed whether a tax sale qualifies as an "arm's
length, bona fide sale" under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2,237 and concluded by
agreeing with the trial court that it does not qualify. 238 In 2012, W.D.
Ballard and Nancy Mock purchased twenty-two parcels of land in
Newton County at tax sales (the Property). In April 2013, the county tax
assessors' office sent Ballard and Mock the 2013 property assessments.
The assessors did not set the 2013 value at the 2012 tax sale purchase
price. Ballard and Mock appealed the property tax assessment; however,
the Georgia Board of Tax Assessors (the Board) concluded the value
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Id. at 323, 779 S.E.2d at 440.
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Id. at 323-24, 779 S.E.2d at 441.
Id. at 324, 779 S.E.2d at 441.
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332 Ga. App. 521, 773 S.E.2d 780 (2015).
O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2 (2010 & 2016 Supp).
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represented "fair market value and uniformity." 239 Ballard and Mock
appealed to the Newton County Board of Equalization, which agreed with
the tax assessor's valuation. They then appealed to the superior court,
claiming the one-year purchase price cap established under O.C.G.A. §
48-5-2(3) should apply to the assessed value of the property. The trial
court granted summary judgment to the Board.240
In essence, the trial court found that because (1) the tax sale purchaser
does not receive fee simple title to the property and does not to enjoy the
right of possession; (2) the property owner retains the right to redeem the
property and divest the tax sale purchaser of any rights; and (3) the
owner of the property sold at a tax sale is not a participant in the sale,
there is no arm's length, bona fide sale under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(.1).241
Therefore, properties purchased at tax sales do not qualify for the oneyear purchase price freeze under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3).242
O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3) provides in part: "Notwithstanding any other
provision of this chapter to the contrary, the transaction amount of the
most recent arm's length, bona fide sale in any year shall be the
243
This
maximum allowable fair market value for the next taxable year."

amounts to a freeze on the ad valorem tax value of property for one
year. 24 4 For purposes of the code section,
'[A]rm's length, bona fide sale' means a transaction which has occurred
in good faith without fraud or deceit carried out by unrelated or
unaffiliated parties, as by a willing buyer and a willing seller, each
acting in his or her own self-interest, including but not limited to a
245
distress sale, short sale, bank sale, or sale at public auction.
Ballard and Mock claimed even though O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2 (.1) does not
specifically identify a tax sale as an example of an arm's length, bona fide
sale, their tax sale purchase was entitled to the one-year purchase price
freeze set forth in O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2 (3) because it was an arm's length
sale at public auction between unrelated parties, a willing buyer and a
willing seller, each acting in their own self-interest. 246 However, the
Georgia Court of Appeals looked to the legislative intent behind the
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Id. at 522, 773 S.E.2d at 781.
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Id. at 522, 773 S.E.2d at 781-82.
Id. at 522, 773 S.E.2d at 782.
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Georgia Tax Code as a whole to reach its determination.24 7 After
analyzing the legislative intent, the court determined that the legislative
intent was to place value on property that it would receive under a
customary sale of property, not an atypical transaction, such as a tax
sale. 248 Additionally, the court found persuasive that a tax sale only

conveys a defeasible title subject to the right of the owner rather than
conveying fee simple title. 24 9 Therefore, the Georgia Court of Appeals
agreed with the trial court that because "fair market value of property"
is not defined as the amount a buyer would pay and a seller willing to
accept for a defeasible interest in property, a tax sale does not qualify as
an arm's length, bona fide sale such that the one year freeze of O.C.G.A.
§ 48-5-2(3) applies. 250 The court determined that the issue of proper
assessment of the fair market value remained pending in the lower
court. 251

In Columbus Board of Tax Assessors v. The Medical Center Hospital
Authority,252 the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
finding that eight parcels of land owned by the hospital authority were
exempt from ad valorem taxation under O.C.G.A. § 31-7-72(e)(1). 253 The
Columbus, Georgia Board of Tax Assessors (the Tax Board) appealed the
trial court's grant of summary judgment to The Medical Center Hospital
Authority (the Hospital Authority). The trial court found that the eight
parcels owned by the Hospital Authority were exempt from ad valorem
property taxes for the years 2009 through 2012. The Tax Board argued
the trial court erred in concluding that the parcels were "public property"
exempt from taxation regardless of how the property was being used. 254

The Hospital Authority submitted a "Request for Non-Taxability" for
eight properties for the years 2009 through 2012 to the Tax Board. 255 The
requests were subsequently denied. The Hospital Authority appealed the
denial of non-taxability to the Muscogee County Board of Equalization,
which granted the request as to one parcel and denied it as to the other
seven parcels. The Tax Board appealed the single grant of non-taxability
to the superior court, while the Hospital Authority appealed the denial
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Id.
Id. at 523-24, 773 S.E.2d at 782.
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Id.
336 Ga. App. 746, 783 S.E.2d 182 (2016).
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of the other seven parcels to the superior court, which consolidated all of
the actions. 256 Following a hearing, the superior court granted the
Hospital Authority's motion for summary judgment, holding that "all
eight of the parcels of real property .

.

. whose taxability for ad valorem

property tax purposes was properly before this court, are determined to
be exempt from ad valorem property taxation." 257 The Tax Board argued
the trial court erred by holding that all of the parcels at issue were
"'public property' exempt from ad valorem property taxation, regardless
of how these parcels are used by the Authority, its lessee Doctors
25
Hospital, and a private, for-profit sublessee." 8 The Board also argued
the trial court erred in holding that the medical office building occupied
259
by a for-profit clinic was tax-exempt.
The first question addressed by the court of appeals was whether all
real property owned by a hospital authority is automatically exempt from
ad valorem taxes "regardless of the factual circumstances surrounding
260
how these parcels are used."

The second question was whether a

medical office building leased to a for-profit clinic, which is located on the
same parcel of property occupied by a nonprofit hospital, was subject to
ad valorem taxes. 261 The court relied on statutes and prior case law to
evaluate the questions. 262 It found that in 1964, the Georgia legislature
amended the Hospital Authorities Law to afford hospital authority-run
263
In
hospitals the same tax relief granted to government-run hospitals.
1970, the Supreme Court of Georgia held in Hospital Authority of Albany
v. Stewart264 that real property owned by a hospital authority that
produces income used to further the authority's mission is exempt from
ad valorem taxes. 265 In Stewart, the supreme court's decision evaluated
the relevance of a hospital's use of property in determining its tax exempt
status. 266 The supreme court determined in Stewart that while the
property was not part of the hospital, its income was "devoted to public
purposes (hospital operations) in the furtherance of the legitimate
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functions of the hospital authority"; therefore, it was exempt from ad
valorem taxes. 267
In Columbus Board, only one of the eight properties generated any
income during the tax years in question. 268 Therefore, a determination
needed to be made whether the income produced was devoted to hospital
operations in furtherance of the hospital authority. 269 As to the other
seven non-income producing properties, a determination had to be made
whether this "use" was devoted to public purposes in furtherance of the
Hospital Authority's legitimate functions. 270
In support of its motion for summary judgment, the Hospital Authority
submitted an affidavit explaining how each parcel was used. The
Hospital Authority argued all of the parcels supported and
complemented the provision and the receipt of medical services. Use of
the parcels ranged from a hospital and medical offices to a multi-level
parking garage for visitor and employee use. The Tax Board argued tax
exemptions should be strictly construed, and the Hospital Authority
failed to demonstrate the parcels were being used to further its legitimate
functions, namely undeveloped land next to the hospital and parking
lots.271

The Georgia Court of Appeals determined the evidence established
that all of the parcels were being used to further the legitimate function
of the Hospital Authority and that none of the properties were used for a
purpose "wholly unrelated" to the Hospital Authority's function. 272 It
noted that the parking lots furthered the function of the hospital by
providing free parking to patients, visitors, and employees, and that the
walking trails were available to patients, visitors, and employees. 273
Therefore, the court found no error in the trial's court's judgment. 274 The
Tax Board also argued the trial court should not have granted summary
judgment to the Hospital Authority on the taxability of the parcel on
which both Doctors Hospital and the Columbus Clinic were located. 275
"While O.C.G.A. § 31-7-72(e)(1) grants the property tax exemption to
hospital authorities as described earlier, O.C.G.A. § 31-7-72(e)(2)
provides that the property tax exemption does not apply to any real
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property in which 50 percent or more of the floor space is leased to a forprofit entity." 276 One of the parcels owned by the Hospital Authority

contained a hospital and a for-profit company. 277 The Tax Board argued:
[I]f the Hospital Authority had complied with its request to divide the
parcel containing both the hospital and the clinic when it bought the
property, then the portion on which the clinic was located would
clearly have been taxable, because 100 percent of the floor space was
occupied by a for-profit company.278
However, the court determined that "under the plain terms of the
statute, the exemption was not lost, because less than 50 percent of the
floor space on that parcel of land was leased to a for-profit company." 279
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding the parcel exempt from
ad valorem property taxes. 280
VIII. TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY 281
In Atlanta Development Authority v. Clark Atlanta University, Inc.,282
the Atlanta Development Authority (the Authority) sought a
determination of Clark Atlanta University's (the University)
reversionary rights to three adjoining parcels of real property (the
Property) the University had donated to Morris Brown College (the
College) in 1940.283 Although the Georgia Supreme Court allowed the
interlocutory review, it ultimately affirmed the trial court's denial of the
motion to dismiss. 284 In its ruling, the supreme court focused on the
granting clause contained in the one page deed (the Deed) conveying the
Property to the College. 285 The granting clause stated the conveyance
was subject to the condition that the College use the Property for
educational purposes, and if the College ceased to use the Property for
educational purposes, title to the Property reverted to the University. 286

276. Id.
277. Id. at 752-53, 783 S.E.2d at 187.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 753, 783 S.E.2d at 187.
280. Id.
281. This section is written by Teresa L. Bailey, of counsel in the law firm of Baker,
Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Florida
(B.A., 1983); Emory University School of Law (J.D., 1986); Member, State Bar of Georgia.
282. 298 Ga. 575, 784 S.E.2d 353 (2016).
283. Id. at 575, 784 S.E.2d at 355.
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In 2012, the College filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in an
attempt to avoid foreclosure. In 2014, the College sought the bankruptcy
court's approval of the sale of a portion of the College's campus that
included the Property to the Authority. The bankruptcy court granted
permission for the sale to proceed, but specifically held that the College
could only sell whatever interest in the Property it had under the Deed.
The bankruptcy court further held that the Authority took title to the
Property subject to any interest the University may have had under the
Deed. After the sale, the University filed the present suit (the Complaint)
seeking declaratory judgment that (1) the Deed conveyed either a fee
simple determinable estate or fee simple estate subject to a limitation,
that the University had a valid automatic reversionary interest in the
Property under the Deed, and that the reversionary interest was
triggered when the College stopped using the Property for educational
purposes when it sold its interest to the Authority; or (2) with respect to
any of the Property the College was still using for educational purposes,
the moment the College ceased to use such portions of the Property for
educational purposes, title to the Property immediately and
automatically reverted back to the University. In response to the
Complaint, the Authority filed a motion to dismiss challenging the
287
validity, scope, and application of the restriction and reverter.
In affirming the trial court, the supreme court determined that the
restriction fell within the "charitable purposes" exemption to the general
rule against restraints on alienation. 288 Citing with approval the case
FirstRebecca Baptist Church, Inc. v. Atlanta Cotton Mills,
court explained the purpose of the exemption:

28

9 the supreme

The reasoning is that inasmuch as a donor may make a gift for
charitable purposes which is perpetual in duration, as a corollary of
this right and in order to effectuate the primary purpose of the gift,
the donor may impose a condition that the gifted property is not to be
alienated, but is to continue in the hands of the donee in perpetuity.
[Citation omitted.] Public policy favors giving the donor's distinct
charitable interest greater weight than general prohibitions against
290
the remoteness of vesting and restrictions on alienation.
The supreme court found that there was no question the University
intended to donate the Property to what it deemed was a charitable
organization for educational purposes, which the court found to be
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"proper matters of charity." 291 The court further found that the estate
created by the Deed was a fee simple determinable estate since the Deed
provided for an automatic reversion of the estate to the grantor upon the
discontinuation of the limited use for which the grantor made the
conveyance. 292 Once the Property was no longer used by the College for
educational purposes, title automatically returned to the University. 293
The supreme court did not accept the Authority's argument that the
sale of the Property generated funds to the College to use for educational
purposes, and that use of the funds for educational purposes satisfied the
use restriction in the Deed. 294 The court noted that the Deed set forth

specific areas of study which qualified for acceptable use, and that the
restriction was also limited to the College's use and not use by a successor
entity. 295
In Bagwell v. Trammel,296 the Georgia Supreme examined issues
regarding equitable partition. Thomas Bagwell (Bagwell) filed suit
against Bobby and Oretta Trammel (the Trammels) for breach of a joint
venture contract. The evidence demonstrated that Bagwell and the
Trammels had entered into a joint venture agreement (the Agreement)
establishing an entity known as Etowah Ventures in 2000. Under the
Agreement, Bagwell agreed to cancel promissory notes in the amount of
$1,875,000 either owed or guaranteed by the Trammels (Notes), in
exchange for a one-half undivided interest in 103 acres of unimproved
land (the Property) owned by the Trammels. It was intended that the
Property would be owned by the Trammels and Bagwell as joint tenants
in common, but titled in the name of the Trammels in trust for the benefit
of Etowah Ventures. Under the Agreement, upon the sale of the
Property, Bagwell would be paid the original principal amount of the
cancelled Notes plus interest first, and any additional profits would be
split equally between the Trammels and Bagwell. 297
By 2002, none of the Property had been sold, and the Trammels needed
additional funds. So, Bagwell and the Trammels entered into an
amendment to the Agreement (the Amendment) in which Bagwell
advanced $600,000 to the Trammels in exchange for a 70/30 split in any
profits from the sale. In August 2004, 73.6 acres of the Property were
sold and the proceeds were distributed pursuant to the Amendment. On
291.
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293.
294.
295.
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September 1, 2004, the Trammels conveyed by warranty deed the
remaining twenty-nine acres of the Property to their sons. Bagwell
discovered the transfer and immediately filed an affidavit disputing the
validity of the transfer. The parties negotiated without success for six
years to resolve the dispute, and Bagwell filed suit seeking declaratory
judgment, cancellation of the warranty deed to the Trammels' sons,
imposition of a constructive trust, dissolution of the joint venture, and
seeking an accounting. 298
In 2013, after the suit had been filed, the sons quit-claimed their
interest in the remaining Property back to the Trammels. Bagwell
subsequently amended the suit by dropping the moot claims and adding
claims for equitable dissolution and accounting of Etowah Ventures,
equitable partitioning, and specific performance. After a bench trial, the
trial court granted Bagwell's request for equitable partitioning and
accounting, granted the request to equitably dissolve Etowah Ventures,
and appointed a receiver to sell the remaining Property and distribute
the profits. The trial court further held that upon such a sale, the
Trammels (collectively) and Bagwell each would be entitled to the 50/50
split of the profits under the Agreement and not the 70/30 split contained
in the Amendment. In making this ruling, the trial court specifically held
that it was not bound to follow the formula set forth in the Amendment
299
in the exercise of its equitable powers. Bagwell appealed.
In affirming the trial court, a divided supreme court determined that
not only was the trial court authorized to consider all of the
circumstances beyond what was contained in the Agreement and
Amendment in adjusting the accounts and claims of the parties, but that
the trial court had the duty to do so in the exercise of its equitable
powers.300 The supreme court found no abuse of discretion because in
making the award, the trial court properly considered Bagwell's decision
to seek equitable partition and early dissolution of the joint venture,
which forced a sale of the remaining Property at a time the Trammels
301
believed would bring a substantially reduced price.
In Kim v. First IntercontinentalBank ("Kim II'),302 the Georgia Court
of Appeals examined issues of deed reformation and equitable
subrogation and ultimately held that a bank's interest in a reformed
03
security deed is not limited to the amount to which it is subrogated.3
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The facts demonstrated that Yong Ho Han (Han) purchased a shopping
center in 1999 and granted two security deeds to SunTrust totaling
$576,900, which were recorded by SunTrust. In 2006, Han conveyed by
warranty deed a half interest in the property to Chan Kim (Kim), and on
the same day, they conveyed their interests in the property by warranty
deed to H&K Deans Bridge Properties LLC (H&K). The warranty deeds
to Kim and H&K were not recorded at the time of the conveyance. 304
After the conveyances to Kim and H&K, Han refinanced the SunTrust
debt with a loan from First Intercontinental Bank (the Bank) in the
amount of $620,000.
The security deed with the Bank, however,
contained an incorrect legal description of the property. The Bank had
no notice of the prior conveyances to Kim and H&K since the warranty
deeds were not of record. In 2008, Kim and H&K recorded their warranty
deeds, and in 2009, H&K conveyed the property back to Han and Kim.
The Bank sued Han and Kim seeking reformation of the security deed to
correct the legal description of the property and a declaration that the
Bank held a first priority lien against the property under the doctrine of
equitable subrogation to the extent its funds were used to pay off
SunTrust. The trial court both reformed the security deed and granted
priority to the security deed by virtue of equitable subrogation. Kim
appealed. 305 The court of appeals rejected Kim's challenge to the
reformation ruling and upheld the conclusion that equitable subrogation
applied. The court of appeals, however, remanded the case to the trial
court to determine the proper subrogation amount. 306
On remand, the trial court determined the Bank was equitably
subrogated to a first priority lien in the amount the Bank paid to satisfy
SunTrust, $403,610.82. The trial court further found that the entire
property was encumbered by the Bank's security deed, which secured
repayment of an amount that exceeded the subrogated interest. Kim
appealed this ruling asserting that the Bank's claim should be limited to
the amount paid to SunTrust, and that the Bank should be required to
release its lien upon payment of $403,610.82.307
In affirming the trial court, the court of appeals pointed out that it had
affirmed the trial court's ruling reforming the security deed in Kim I, and
the determination that Kim's interest is subject to, or subordinate to, a
reformed security deed.308 Since the legal description was corrected, the
304.
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reformed deed related back to the date of the original conveyance, 2006,
and the deed so reformed took priority over subsequently filed interests,
including Kim's 2008 warranty deed and 2009 reconveyance. 309 The
court explained that the reformed deed and the subrogated first priority
lien represent different interests: one based upon contract, and one
arising in equity. 310 As such, Kim's claim that the Bank was limited to
the payoff to SunTrust was without merit.3 11
In Cronan v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.,312 Michael Cronan
(Cronan) appealed the dismissal of his counterclaim to quiet title brought
against JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase). The underlying facts
showed Cronan had obtained a loan for $417,000 from Chase and
executed a security deed. The legal description of the security deed
described property Cronan also owned that happened to be located on the
same street as the property the parties had intended to be the security
for the loan. Cronan went into default, and Chase foreclosed on the
property described in the security deed but not the intended property.31 3
After the foreclosure, Chase conveyed the property to Fannie Mae who
instituted eviction proceedings for the intended property, which Fannie
Mae identified on the dispossessory warrant as being also known as the
The magistrate in the
property described in the security deed.
dispossessory proceeding found that Fannie Mae only owned the property
as described in its vesting deed and granted a writ of possession for only
that property. Two years later, Chase's counsel recorded an Affidavit of
Title providing notice of Chase's intent to file suit to correct the legal
description error of the underlying security deed, and a law suit was filed
thereafter. Cronan answered and counterclaimed for libel and abusive
collection, sought dismissal of the complaint, and moved for the recovery
of attorney fees. Chase voluntarily dismissed the complaint without
prejudice, but filed another Affidavit of Title to provide notice of the
erroneous legal description. Chase also moved to dismiss Cronan's
In response, Cronan amended his answer and
counterclaim.
counterclaim to include a claim for quiet title. The trial court denied
Cronan's motions and dismissed the counterclaims, and Cronan
appealed.3 14
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336 Ga. App. 201, 784 S.E.2d 57 (2016).
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The court of appeals found that the counterclaim did in fact meet the
pleading requirements of the quiet title statute. 315 The court found that
the complaint set forth the Affidavits of Title filed by Chase cast a cloud
on title to the property that was not described in the underlying security
deed which Cronan claimed to own free and clear of any lien by Chase.316
Accordingly, the court of appeals found that the trial court committed
error by dismissing the counterclaim.317 The court of appeals, however,
affirmed the trial court's denial of attorney fees in favor of Cronan since
the quiet title counterclaim was not independent from the claims for
reformation of the security deed contained in the complaint. 318 The court
of appeals also affirmed the trial court's refusal to allow Cronan to depose
the attorney who executed the Affidavits of Title since the allegations of
the Affidavits described the relationship of the parties or other objective
facts affecting title. 319
In Johnson v. Bank of America, N.A.,320 Bobby Johnson (Johnson), the
plaintiff, filed a petition to quiet title to remove a security deed in favor
of Pine States Mortgage Corporation (Pine States) and the assignments
of the security deed to Bank of America N.A. (BoA) and Bank of New York
Mellon (BONY) as clouds on his title. Johnson alleged in his complaint
that Pine States was a dissolved mortgage lender that had relinquished
its rights to the security deed in 2007, and the assignments of the security
deed to BoA and BONY, in 2011 and 2012, could not have conveyed any
interest. BoA was served and filed an answer and motion to dismiss the
complaint on the basis that Johnson lacked standing to challenge the
assignments. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and Johnson
appealed. 321
In reversing the trial court, the court of appeals determined that
Johnson had met the pleading requirements to bring a quiet title action
by alleging he held title to the property by way of a warranty deed by (1)
including a legal description of the property at issue in his complaint; (2)
attaching a plat of survey to the complaint, he identified the interests
adverse to his and the instruments upon which the adverse claims were
based; and (3) alleging that Pine States had relinquished any interest it
had under the security deed and that the later assignments of the

315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
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Id. at 204, 784 S.E.2d at 60.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 205, 784 S.E.2d at 61.
333 Ga. App. 539, 773 S.E.2d 810 (2015).
Id. at 539-40, 773 S.E.2d at 811-12.
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security deed had no legal effect. 322 The court found that regardless of the
merits of Johnson's claim, Johnson had in fact stated a claim under the
Quiet Title Act and his complaint should not have been dismissed.323
The court of appeals rejected BoA's position that Johnson lacked
standing to challenge the assignments because he was not a party to the
assignments. 324 The court found that the plaintiff in a quiet title case
does not need to be a party to the instrument the plaintiff considers to be
a cloud in order to bring the action to remove the cloud. 325 The court
stated, "[T]he fact that Johnson was not a party to the assignments that
he challenges does not destroy his standing to assert that those
assignments are clouds upon his title."32 6
Looking at yet more quiet title issues in TDGA, LLC v. CBIRA, LLC,327
the Georgia Supreme Court determined that sovereign immunity bars
32
quiet title actions brought under the conventional quiet title statutes, 8
but sovereign immunity does not bar quiet title actions brought in rem
against all the world. 329 The undisputed facts were TDGA, LLC (TDGA)
acquired the property at issue from a party who had purchased the
property at a tax sale, foreclosed the equity of redemption, and filed a
conventional quiet title action against all parties with a recorded interest
in the property, including the Georgia Department of Revenue and the
Georgia Department of Labor (the Departments), each of which held
recorded liens against the property. The Departments filed a joint
motion to dismiss claiming the suit was barred due to sovereign
immunity. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and TDGA
appealed.330
In affirming the trial court, the Georgia Supreme Court conducted a
constitutional analysis of sovereign immunity and concluded that the
state and its agencies are immune from suit unless the legislature
specifically states otherwise.33 1 Since there is no explicit waiver of
sovereign immunity in the statutes governing foreclosure of the right of
redemption and conventional quiet title actions, the state and its

322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

Id. at 541-42, 773 S.E.2d at 813.
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298 Ga. 510, 783 S.E.2d 107 (2016).
See O.C.G.A. § 23-3-40 (1982).
TDGA, 298 Ga. at 510, 783 S.E.2d at 107; O.C.G.A. § 23-3-60 (1982).
TDGA, 298 Ga. at 510-11, 783 S.E.2d at 107-08.
Id. at 511-12, 783 S.E.2d at 108.
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agencies are immune from suit under O.C.G.A. § 23-3-40.332 The court,
however, distinguished between conventional quiet title and quieting
title in rem. 333 An action brought in rem is not an action against the state
or any other person or entity. It is an action against the underlying
property, and any person claiming an interest in that property, including
the state, must affirmatively assert that claim in the quiet title action. 334
In the case Harris v. West Central Georgia Bank, 335 Andy Harris
(Harris) filed suit against West Central Georgia Bank (the Bank) to stop
the foreclosure of property in which Harris claimed he had a superior
security interest. The property at issue was owned by Phillip Adcock
(Adcock), who had given Harris a security deed to the property in 2007
as security for repayment of a promissory note in the amount of $150,000.
However, no promissory note to Harris existed and no money had
actually changed hands. The security deed came about in connection
with a limited liability company (the LLC) that had been formed by
Harris, Adcock, and a third party, who purchased forty-five lots in a
subdivision using a $1,350,000 loan from AgSouth Farm Credit ACA
(AgSouth). AgSouth required additional collateral for the loan, and
Harris was the only member of the LLC with the wherewithal to provide
the additional collateral. The security deed given by Adcock to Harris
was an attempt by Harris to balance liability for the loan with AgSouth.
Thereafter, Harris' security deed in Adcock's property was cancelled of
record by an instrument Harris claimed was forged. Adcock obtained
other loans security by the same property, but ultimately failed to pay
the loan to the Bank who commenced foreclosure against the property.
Harris filed suit to enjoin the foreclosure and to have the cancellation of
his security deed set aside. The Bank counterclaimed to quiet title. The
trial court dismissed Harris' complaint and granted the Bank's
counterclaim to quiet title at the conclusion of a bench trial. The trial
court found that it was unnecessary to determine if the cancellation of
the security deed was a forgery because the security deed itself was
invalid for lack of a valid debt actually secured by the instrument. 336
Harris appealed asserting three enumerations of error: (1) Harris was
given the security deed by Adcock to secure Adcock's obligations under
the operating agreement of the LLC; (2) the security deed was not invalid
because the consideration it identified was a mistake; and (3) the Bank
lacked standing to attack the security deed between Harris and Adcock
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

Id. at 512, 783 S.E.2d at 108.
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Id. at 512, 783 S.E.2d at 109.
335 Ga. App. 114, 779 S.E.2d 441 (2015).
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since the Bank was not a party to the agreement. 337 The court scrutinized
the LLC's operating agreement and found that there was no obligation of
any of the members to contribute more than initial minimal capital
investment, and that there was no provision creating an obligation for
each member to pay one-third of the cost of any property purchased by
the LLC.338 As such, Adcock was not contractually liable to Harris under
the operating agreement for $150,000 of the down payment to the Bank
for the loan.3 3 9

Regarding the mistaken consideration argument, the court found that
had the parties intended performance of obligations under the operating
agreement to constitute consideration for the security deed, Harris and
Adcock could have drafted the security deed to reflect that intent. 340
Adcock did not agree the intent of the security deed was to secure
performance under the operating agreement. As such, the court of
appeals found that the mistake was not a mutual mistake, and equity
could not intervene to reform the security deed. 341 Lastly, the court
addressed Harris' lack of standing argument: since the Bank was not a
party to the security deed between Harris and Adcock, the Bank could
not attack it.342 The court found that the applicable statute provides that
quiet title will be sustained where any instrument casts a cloud on
title. 34 3 Here, the Bank asserted the invalid security deed was a cloud on
its title. The fact the Bank was not a party to the instrument for the
purposes of its quiet title counterclaim was of no consequence. 344
In the case Caraway v. Spillers,345 the Caraways received a deed from
Wendy Caraway's grandmother, Nettie Spillers, for two acres of property
in 1998. The Caraways immediately took possession of the two acres,
placed a manufactured home on it, and lived there as their residence
until 2011. The Caraways, however, did not record their deed. In 2003,
Nettie Spillers deeded the same two acres to Matt Spillers (Spillers),
Wendy Caraway's uncle, and Spillers immediately recorded his deed.
The Caraways recorded their deed to the property one month after
Spillers recorded his deed. In 2011, Spillers filed suit to cancel Caraways'
deed, and the Caraways filed a response claiming, among other things,
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339.
340.
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Id. at 115, 779 S.E.2d at 443.
Id. at 116, 779 S.E.2d at 443.
Id.
Id. at 117, 779 S.E.2d at 444.
Id.
Id.
Id. See also O.G.G.A § 23-3-40.
Harris, 335 Ga. App. at 117, 779 S.E.2d at 444.
332 Ga. App. 588, 774 S.E.2d 162 (2015).
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that they had acquired title to the property by adverse possession. The
trial court granted summary judgment to Spillers based strictly on the
date of recording of the two deeds, and found that since Spillers was first
in time, his deed was valid and the Caraways' was not. The Caraways
appealed. 346
The court of appeals held that an occupant's possession is analogous
to constructive notice. 347 Anyone who purchases or contracts for a deed
to real property is required to inquire into the right of any person in
possession of the property, and such possession is notice of whatever title
or right the occupant claims to have in the property. 348 Accordingly, the
court reversed and remanded the case because an issue of fact remained
as to whether the Caraways' possession of the property put Spillers on
notice of their title. 349
IX.: TRESPASS AND NUISANCE

350

Trespass and nuisance are related doctrines that protect interests in
the exclusive possession and use and enjoyment of land. Accordingly, the
courts are routinely clarifying these interests. During this Survey period,
the courts particularly took note of issues relating to damages.
In OglethorpePower Corp. v. Estate of Forrister,351 the Georgia Court
of Appeals considered whether discomfort and annoyance were elements
of nuisance damages and whether those damages could be asserted by a
limited liability company. 352 In Oglethorpe, neighboring property owners
brought suit against a power plant owner, Smarr EMC (Smarr), and
operator, Oglethorpe Power Corporation (Oglethorpe), complaining of
noises and vibrations coming from the plant. The Oglethorpe litigation
has a long history in the courts and was first appealed by Oglethorpe and
Smarr after the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the
property owners. Thereafter, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed, and
Oglethorpe and Smarr petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court of Georgia which affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
On remand, the trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict in favor of

346. Id. at 588-89, 774 S.E.2d at 162-63.
347. Id. at 589, 774 S.E.2d at 163.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 589-90, 774 S.E.2d at 163.
350. This section was authored by Sabrina Lynn Atkins, associate in the firm of Baker,
Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia College & State
University (B.A., with honors, 2010); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law
(J.D., magna cum laude, 2013).
351. 332 Ga. App. 693, 774 S.E.2d 755 (2015).
352. Id. at 707-08, 774 S.E.2d at 766-67.
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the property owners; Oglethorpe and Smarr appealed, and the property
owners cross appealed. 353
First, Oglethorpe and Smarr, relying on City of Warner Robins v.
Holt,354 argued discomfort and annoyance equate to emotional distress,
not nuisance damages. 355 However, the court of appeals disagreed. 356
Relying on the Restatement (Second) of Torts and O.C.G.A. § 41-1-4,357
the court of appeals stated that "[a] private nuisance may injure either a
person or property, or both, and for that injury a right of action accrues
to the person who is injured or whose property is damaged." 358 The court
went on to find that issues of "'discomfort and annoyance' in the context
of nuisance is not a species of emotional distress, but a distinct element
of nuisance damages . . ."359
Next, the court considered whether the discomfort and annoyance
damages could be asserted by a limited liability company.360 Relying on
the United States Supreme Court's holding in Baltimore & Potomac
Railroad Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church,361 the court held in the
affirmative. 362 In Baltimore, the Supreme Court found that a church, a
religious corporation created under the General Incorporation Act, could
bring a claim for annoyance and discomfort damages against a railroad
company after it built an engine yard and machine shop next to the
church building. 363 After noting that Baltimore had been relied on by
numerous Georgia courts, the court of appeals concluded "that a limited
liability company may have a cause of action for 'discomfort and
annoyance' affecting the use of its property for the purposes intended by
its members and those they permit to join them." 364
Finally, the court took up the question of whether a limited liability
company was an "occupant" of its property for the purposes of damages.
365 While Oglethorpe and Smarr contended "occupant" was equivalent to
"resident" and therefore the appellant could not recover, the court of
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appeals disagreed.36 6 The court of appeals noted "residence is not
necessary for occupancy." 367 Notably, the holding in McIntyre v.
Scarbrough68 by the Georgia Supreme Court rejects Oglethorpe and
Smarr's position and holds:
'Occupy' is more expansively defined in Black's Law Dictionary ... as
'to hold possession of; to hold or keep for use; to possess.' Because one
may occupy a residence by holding it or keeping it for use, the court
erred in imposing a requirement that permanent physical presence
was necessary to fulfill the occupancy requirement of the warranty
369

deed.

Moreover, the court of appeals noted that in Baltimore, church members
and their guests did not reside at the property, but rather used the
property for church and Sunday school; this did not affect the
corporation's claim for nuisance damages.370 Accordingly, the court of
appeals held "that the trial court erred in removing the issue of damages
371
for 'discomfort and annoyance' from consideration [of] the jury."
372
In Toyo Tire North America Manufacturing, Inc. v. Davis, Duron
and Lynn Davis (the Davis's) filed an action against Toyo Tire North
America Manufacturing (Toyo Tire) alleging trespass, continuing
trespass, and nuisance resulting from Toyo Tire's operation of a tire
manufacturing plant which is located in close proximity to the Davis'
home. Toyo Tire filed a motion for summary judgment which was
ultimately denied by the trial court. Thereafter, the trial court granted
Toyo Tire's motion for immediate review. Toyo Tire began operating its
facility near the Davis' home in 2006. Thereafter, the Davis' hired
counsel who sent a letter to Toyo Tire requesting that Toyo Tire purchase
the Davis' home in order to avoid litigation. Due to Toyo Tire's continued
operations and refusal to purchase the Davis' home, the Davis's filed
their complaint in 2013 alleging they were subject to constant noise
including truck traffic and alarms, black dust, foul odors, and
unsightliness. 37

366. Id.
367. Id.
368. 266 Ga. 824, 471 S.E.2d 199 (1996).
369. Oglethorpe, 332 Ga. App. at 712-13, 774 S.E.2d at 769-70 (quoting McIntyre, 266
Ga. at 825, 471 S.E.2d 199).
370. Id. at 713-14, 774 S.E.2d at 770.
371. Id. at 714, 774 S.E.2d at 770.
372. 333 Ga. App. 211, 775 S.E.2d 796 (2015).
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On appeal, Toyo Tire argued that the Davis' claims are barred by the
four-year statute of limitations. 374 However, based on the Georgia
Supreme Court's ruling in Cox v. Cambridge Square Towne Houses,
Inc., 375 the court of appeals disagreed. 376 In Cox, the supreme court held
that if the nuisance is a continuing one, "the statute does not run from
the time of the first harm except as to the harm then caused." 377 The

court of appeals held that because there was evidence Toyo Tire
continued to grow throughout the years and expand its business, the
permanence of the alleged trespasses entitled the Davis's to elect to
recover for all damages or past invasions occurring no more than four
years before they filed their complaint. 378
Next, Toyo Tire contended that the Davis's failed to show that the
alleged trespass and nuisance proximately caused the value of their
property to decrease. 379 While Toyo Tire did not dispute the Davis's
appraisal expert's valuation of the property, it did contend that the
appraiser failed to testify that the diminution in value was caused by
Toyo Tire. 380 However, the court of appeals held that because the
appraisal expert considered characteristics relating to the Toyo Tire
facility, giving rise to the nuisance and trespass claim, his opinion was
not entirely speculative. 381 Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the
trial court's denial of summary judgment. 382
Finally, and similar to the court of appeals' holding in Oglethorpe, the
court of appeals held that contrary to Toyo Tire's argument, the Davis's
could recover both diminution in value as well as discomfort and
annoyance damages under their nuisance claim. 383

In Ridley v. Turner,384 the Turners sued Ridley claiming trespass and
nuisance relating to erosion from grading and construction on the Ridley
property, which in turn caused sediment deposits in Turners' pond. The
jury ultimately awarded the Turners $80,000 and $10,000 for their
trespass and nuisance claim, respectively. 385 The main argument made
on appeal by Ridley concerned whether the proper measure of damages
374.
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was the difference in the market value of the property before and after
386
Ridley argued the trial
the damage occurred from the sedimentation.
court erred when it instructed the jury that "under Georgia law, cost of
repair and diminution of value are alternative, although sometimes
interchangeable, measures of damages in trespass cases. The plaintiffs
may choose to present their case using either or both methods of
387
measuring damages depending on the particular circumstances."
The court of appeals noted that in the instant case, the Turners elected
to focus on the cost of repair as the measure of damages, which when
based on Georgia law, was appropriate so long as the amount of damages
388
Thus, because the damages
did not exceed the value of the property.
awarded to Turner, totaling $90,000, did not exceed the value of the
property, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's instruction.389
X. ZONING

3 90

Turning lastly to zoning law, in Burton v. Glynn County,391 the
Supreme Court of Georgia upheld the trial court's determination that
property owners had operated their property in violation of the zoning
ordinance. 392 The trial court's decision was affirmed because the
frequency of the events and the systematic manner in which the property
has been marketed and utilized for large-scale gatherings supported the
conclusion that the property's use as an event venue was beyond that
393
In 2008, Burton (the
expected or customary for a one-family dwelling.
Burtons), owners of an oceanfront property on St. Simons Island, began
to offer the property as a short-term vacation rental, and over time, the
Burtons' home became a popular venue for weddings and large
By 2010, neighbors began to file complaints with the
gatherings.
homeowners association and local law enforcement in regards to
39
excessive noise, parking issues, and traffic.

4
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393. Id. at 544-45, 547, 776 S.E.2d at 181-83.
394. Id. at 544-45, 776 S.E.2d at 181.

2016]

REAL PROPERTY

275

In response to these complaints, Glynn County conducted an
investigation where they determined the Burtons were operating the
property as a commercial event venue. 395 As a result, the county issued
a cease and desist letter contending the Burtons' operation of the
property in this manner was not a permitted use in an R-6 district,3 96 and
requested the Burtons immediately discontinue such use.397 In response,
the Burtons filed a lawsuit against the county seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief as well as an order to stop the county's efforts to enforce
its zoning ordinance to prohibit the use of their property as an event
venue. In their complaint, the Burtons claimed enforcing the zoning
ordinance against them would violate their constitutional rights to due
process and equal protection. The county filed a counterclaim seeking a
declaratory judgment confirming its interpretation of the zoning
ordinance. 398
Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court issued an order
where they concluded
The Burtons' permissible accessory use of their property to host a
wedding or social event has become the primary use of their property,
and the magnitude, frequency, and cumulative impact thereof has
moved beyond that expected or customary for a one-family dwelling.
Because this use falls outside the normal scope of residential property
use, it is thus [a violation] of Section 701 of the Glynn County Zoning
Ordinance. 399
The trial court also denied the Burtons' equal protection claims, finding
they had presented no evidence of other residential properties in Glynn
County that were operated in the same manner as the Burtons' property
that were treated differently by the county. Both parties appealed. 400
Citing to Expedia, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 401 the Georgia Supreme
Court held that review of the construction of a zoning ordinance is a

395. Id. at 545, 776 S.E.2d at 181.
396. Id. The Glynn County Zoning Ordinance, § 701.1 states five permitted uses
Government owned or operated use, facility or land (1) One-family dwelling (2) Government
owned or operated use, facility or land (3) Non-commercial horticultural or agriculture, but
not including the keeping of poultry or animals (4) Accessory use in compliance with the
provisions of Section 609 (5) Customary home occupation established under the regulations
of Section 608. Id.
397. Burton, 297 Ga. at 545, 776 S.E.2d at 180.
398. Id. at 545, 776 S.E.2d at 181.
399. Id. at 546, 776 S.E.2d at 182.
400. Id. at 545, 776 S.E.2d at 181-82.
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matter of law subject to a de novo review. 402 The court states "the cardinal
rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the lawmaking
body." 403 To accomplish that intent, the supreme court looked at the
language of the ordinance itself, which stated the ordinance is "designed
to encourage the formation and continuance of a stable, healthy
environment for one-family dwellings. . . ."404 To promote the desired
"low-to-medium density residential" development in R-6 districts, the
ordinance expressly aims "to discourage any encroachment by
commercial, industrial, high density residential, or other uses capable of
adversely affecting the single-family residential character of the
district." 405 As such, the supreme court found that the clear intent of the
ordinance is to restrict the use of properties situated in R-6 zoning
districts primarily to residential use by single families and other uses
that are customarily incidental thereto. 406
Given this intent, the court concluded, as the trial court did, that the
Burtons' use of their property violated the Glynn County Zoning
Ordinance, stating that the frequency of the events and the apparently
systematic manner in which the property has been marketed and utilized
for large-scale gatherings supported the conclusion that the property's
use as an event venue had, as the trial court found, "moved beyond that
expected or customary for a one-family dwelling." 407 The supreme court
went on to affirm the trial court's determination that the Burtons failed
to produce any evidence that would support their equal protection claim,
acknowledging the witness the Burtons produced at the trial level who
stated other homes in the area held similar events, but whom could not
state there were properties that held these events with the frequency
that the Burtons did.408

The remaining issue the trial court did not address was the Burtons'
due process challenge. While citing 105 Floyd Road, Inc. v. Crisp
County,4 09 the court stated that "[t]o satisfy due process, an ordinance

must 'be specific enough to give fair warning of the prohibited
conduct."' 410 The Burtons argued the zoning ordinance failed to define at

402. Burton, 297 Ga. at 546, 776 S.E.2d at 182.
403. Id. (quoting Ervin Co. v. Brown, 228 Ga. 14, 15, 183 S.E.2d 743, 744 (1971)).
404. Id.
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what volume hosting events would move the use from permissible as an
accessory use of a one family dwelling to an impermissible primary use.
In regards to this issue, the court concluded that the ordinance at issue
here is sufficiently specific for "persons of common intelligence" to
recognize that the Burtons' use of the property did not qualify as a
permissible use in an R-6 district, and therefore their due process
challenge fails. 411

In Bulloch County Board of Commissioners v. Williams,412 the Bulloch

County Board of Commissioners (the Board) appealed the superior court
order reversing the Board's denial of a conditional use permit for a
personal care home. 413 The county then appealed the superior court
decision arguing the superior court erred by failing to apply the "any
evidence" standard of review to a local government body's zoning
decision.4 14 The appellate court held that
When reviewing a local governing body's zoning decision, the superior
court applies the any evidence standard of review. In the appellate
courts, the standard of review is whether there is any evidence
supporting the decision of the local governing body, not whether there
is any evidence supporting the decision of the superior court. 415
To accomplish this, the court reviewed the records of the Board which
showed that Williams (Ms. Williams) applied for a conditional use permit
to operate a personal care home. 416 In response, the Bulloch County
Planning and Zoning Department completed a multi-point written
assessment and subsequently recommended an approval of the
application. 41 7
When the Bulloch County Planning and Zoning Department
recommendation went in front of the Board, an attorney representing
eleven adjacent landowners stated several reasons supported a denial of
the application, including: (1) the personal care home could only be
reached by traveling down an unpaved "washboard dirt road, especially
during inclement weather"; (2) "the driveway is narrow and hard to find";
(3) the distance from the home to the nearest hospitals was over 18 miles;
and (4) an adjacent property owner was concerned about liability if a
personal care home resident were to fall in a pond located within 150 feet
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412.
413.
414.
415.
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417.

Id.
332 Ga. App. 815, 773 S.E.2d 37 (2015).
Id. at 815, 773 S.E.2d at 38.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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of the proposed personal care home. 418 The Board, agreeing with the
concerns raised by the adjacent landowners, denied the application, 4 19 to
which Ms. Williams appealed de novo to the superior court. 420
The Georgia Court of Appeals points out that the Bulloch County Code
states that the board of commissioners is not bound by the
recommendation of the planning and zoning commission, and that the
power to approve a conditional use and enact an amendment rests with
the board of commissioners. 4 21 As such, the appellate court held that the
information before the Board regarding the washboard dirt road and the
greater distance from the nearest hospital in comparison to other
approved personal care homes adequately supported the Board's decision
to deny the application for a conditional use permit and reversed the
superior court's order directing the Board of Commissioners to grant the
application. 422

418. Id. at 816, 773 S.E.2d at 39.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Id. at 817, 773 S.E.2d at 39. See also Bulloch County Code, Appendix C,
410(f)(1)(5).
422. Williams, 332 Ga. App. at 817, 773 S.E.2d at 40.
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